Strengthen oversight of risky research on pathogens

Jaspreet Pannu; Megan J. Palmer; Anita Cicero; David A. Relman; Marc Lipsitch; Tom Inglesby

doi:10.1126/science.adf6020

Strengthen oversight of risky research on pathogens

Jaspreet Pannu, Megan J. Palmer, Anita Cicero, David A. Relman, Marc Lipsitch, Tom Inglesby

Bloomberg School of Public Health

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1170-1172
Number of pages	3
Journal	Science
Volume	378
Issue number	6625
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adf6020
State	Published - Dec 16 2022

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General

Access to Document

10.1126/science.adf6020

Cite this

@article{37b1cae501c2424bb8f4d6c8343c063d,

title = "Strengthen oversight of risky research on pathogens",

author = "Jaspreet Pannu and Palmer, {Megan J.} and Anita Cicero and Relman, {David A.} and Marc Lipsitch and Tom Inglesby",

note = "Funding Information: Currently, the required review of ePPP work is limited to experiments funded by HHS, which includes NIH. The policy should be revised so that all agencies that fund work related to the enhancement of potential pandemic pathogens should have that work evaluated under the ePPP framework, including, as applicable, the Department of Defense, Department of Agriculture, and others. In addition, currently neither ePPP nor DURC policies apply to non–federally funded research, leaving the USG and the rest of us in the dark about such work—despite a 2016 National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) recommendation that all ePPP work be subject to oversight, regardless of funding source (11). The USG should use this opportunity to develop new policies and/or legislation to close these gaps in governance. Publishers and research institutions will have a role to play in this regime, as they do for human subjects research. Similar to the policies governing human subjects research, publishers should require that reports of research involving ePPP and/or DURC have been carefully reviewed under the appropriate government oversight framework or that the work has been determined by government not to fall in these categories or require review (12). Such policies of publishers of preprints and journals would provide incentives for countries around the world to establish review systems. Funding Information: D.A.R.received support from the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Endowment at Stanford University. J.P. , M.J.P., A.C., D.A.R., M.L., and T.I. received support from Open Philanthropy. M.L. is the director for Science at the Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics, US Centers for Disease Controland Prevention, under an Intergovernmental Personnel Agreement. He is also an Honorary Faculty member at the Wellcome Sanger Institute and an External Faculty member at the Broad Institute. M.L. has received institutional funding from Pfizer, the Waking Up Foundation, and the FTX Foundation unrelated to this work. He has received honoraria from Bristol Myers Squibb and Sanofi Pasteur, and consulting fees from Merck and Janssen.The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of any institution or government agency.",

year = "2022",

month = dec,

day = "16",

doi = "10.1126/science.adf6020",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "378",

pages = "1170--1172",

journal = "Science",

issn = "0036-8075",

publisher = "American Association for the Advancement of Science",

number = "6625",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Strengthen oversight of risky research on pathogens

AU - Pannu, Jaspreet

AU - Palmer, Megan J.

AU - Cicero, Anita

AU - Relman, David A.

AU - Lipsitch, Marc

AU - Inglesby, Tom

N1 - Funding Information: Currently, the required review of ePPP work is limited to experiments funded by HHS, which includes NIH. The policy should be revised so that all agencies that fund work related to the enhancement of potential pandemic pathogens should have that work evaluated under the ePPP framework, including, as applicable, the Department of Defense, Department of Agriculture, and others. In addition, currently neither ePPP nor DURC policies apply to non–federally funded research, leaving the USG and the rest of us in the dark about such work—despite a 2016 National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) recommendation that all ePPP work be subject to oversight, regardless of funding source (11). The USG should use this opportunity to develop new policies and/or legislation to close these gaps in governance. Publishers and research institutions will have a role to play in this regime, as they do for human subjects research. Similar to the policies governing human subjects research, publishers should require that reports of research involving ePPP and/or DURC have been carefully reviewed under the appropriate government oversight framework or that the work has been determined by government not to fall in these categories or require review (12). Such policies of publishers of preprints and journals would provide incentives for countries around the world to establish review systems. Funding Information: D.A.R.received support from the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Endowment at Stanford University. J.P. , M.J.P., A.C., D.A.R., M.L., and T.I. received support from Open Philanthropy. M.L. is the director for Science at the Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics, US Centers for Disease Controland Prevention, under an Intergovernmental Personnel Agreement. He is also an Honorary Faculty member at the Wellcome Sanger Institute and an External Faculty member at the Broad Institute. M.L. has received institutional funding from Pfizer, the Waking Up Foundation, and the FTX Foundation unrelated to this work. He has received honoraria from Bristol Myers Squibb and Sanofi Pasteur, and consulting fees from Merck and Janssen.The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of any institution or government agency.

PY - 2022/12/16

Y1 - 2022/12/16

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85144587207&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85144587207&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1126/science.adf6020

DO - 10.1126/science.adf6020

M3 - Article

C2 - 36480598

AN - SCOPUS:85144587207

SN - 0036-8075

VL - 378

SP - 1170

EP - 1172

JO - Science

JF - Science

IS - 6625

ER -

Strengthen oversight of risky research on pathogens

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Cite this