TY - CHAP
T1 - How philosophy might contribute to the practical ethics of online manipulation
AU - Barnhill, Anne
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 selection and editorial matter, Fleur Jongepier and Michael Klenk; individual chapters, the contributors.
PY - 2022/1/1
Y1 - 2022/1/1
N2 - There is an increasing concern about the various ways in which humans are influenced online, many of which seem problematic. These forms of problematic influence are sometimes called “manipulative” or “manipulation.” This chapter considers how philosophers and philosophical work might best contribute to the real-world discussion of online manipulation. One way that philosophical work might contribute is by considering: Are these kinds of influence actually instances of manipulation? This chapter first engages in that kind of philosophical inquiry, but then questions whether that inquiry is the most productive way for philosophical work to contribute. This chapter concludes that philosophical accounts of manipulation are helpful, but if we’re interested in understanding online influence and the ways in which it might be problematic, we shouldn’t get bogged down in adjudicating whether particular instances of online influence are manipulative according to these accounts. Instead, when an online influence is called “manipulative, " we should focus on identifying the specific feature(s) of the influence that sparks the charge of manipulation and then query whether influence of that form is problematic. In making this argument, this chapter focuses on a particular category of online influence - political influences that occur online - as an illustrative example.
AB - There is an increasing concern about the various ways in which humans are influenced online, many of which seem problematic. These forms of problematic influence are sometimes called “manipulative” or “manipulation.” This chapter considers how philosophers and philosophical work might best contribute to the real-world discussion of online manipulation. One way that philosophical work might contribute is by considering: Are these kinds of influence actually instances of manipulation? This chapter first engages in that kind of philosophical inquiry, but then questions whether that inquiry is the most productive way for philosophical work to contribute. This chapter concludes that philosophical accounts of manipulation are helpful, but if we’re interested in understanding online influence and the ways in which it might be problematic, we shouldn’t get bogged down in adjudicating whether particular instances of online influence are manipulative according to these accounts. Instead, when an online influence is called “manipulative, " we should focus on identifying the specific feature(s) of the influence that sparks the charge of manipulation and then query whether influence of that form is problematic. In making this argument, this chapter focuses on a particular category of online influence - political influences that occur online - as an illustrative example.
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U2 - 10.4324/9781003205425-4
DO - 10.4324/9781003205425-4
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85143481313
SN - 9781032030012
SP - 49
EP - 71
BT - The Philosophy of Online Manipulation
PB - Taylor and Francis
ER -