TY - JOUR
T1 - Geographic prioritisation in Kenya and Uganda
T2 - A power analysis of donor transition
AU - Paina, Ligia
AU - Rodriguez, Daniela Cristina
AU - Zakumumpa, Henry
AU - Mackenzie, Caroline
AU - Ssengooba, Freddie
AU - Bennett, Sara
N1 - Funding Information:
This study was funded by USAID via Project SOAR, managed by Population Council (agreement no. AID-OAA-A-14-00060). USAID and Population Council provided feedback on the design and results of this study but did not influence the research team‘s interpretation of the findings.
Publisher Copyright:
© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2023. Re-use permitted under CC BY-NC. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.
PY - 2023/5/26
Y1 - 2023/5/26
N2 - Introduction Donor transition for HIV/AIDS programmes remains sensitive, marking a significant shift away from the traditional investment model of large-scale, vertical investments to control the epidemic and achieve rapid scaling-up of services. In late 2015, the United States President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) headquarters instructed their country missions to implement 'geographic prioritisation' (GP), whereby PEPFAR investments would target geographic areas with high HIV burden and reduce or cease support in areas with low burden. Methods Using Gaventa's power cube framework, we compare how power is distributed and manifested using qualitative data collected in an evaluation of the GP's impact in Kenya and Uganda. Results We found that the GP was designed with little space for national and local actors to shape either the policy or its implementation. While decision-making processes limited the scope for national-level government actors to shape the GP, the national government in Kenya claimed such a space, proactively pressuring PEPFAR to change particular aspects of its GP plan. Subnational level actors were typically recipients of top-down decision-making with apparently limited scope to resist or change GP. While civil society had the potential to hold both PEPFAR and government actors accountable, the closed-door nature of policy-making and the lack of transparency about decisions made this difficult. Conclusion Donor agencies should exercise power responsibly, especially to ensure that transition processes meaningfully engage governments and others with a mandate for service delivery. Furthermore, subnational actors and civil society are often better positioned to understand the implications and changes arising from transition. Greater transparency and accountability would increase the success of global health programme transitions, especially in the context of greater decentralisation, requiring donors and country counterparts to be more aware and flexible of working within political systems that have implications for programmatic success.
AB - Introduction Donor transition for HIV/AIDS programmes remains sensitive, marking a significant shift away from the traditional investment model of large-scale, vertical investments to control the epidemic and achieve rapid scaling-up of services. In late 2015, the United States President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) headquarters instructed their country missions to implement 'geographic prioritisation' (GP), whereby PEPFAR investments would target geographic areas with high HIV burden and reduce or cease support in areas with low burden. Methods Using Gaventa's power cube framework, we compare how power is distributed and manifested using qualitative data collected in an evaluation of the GP's impact in Kenya and Uganda. Results We found that the GP was designed with little space for national and local actors to shape either the policy or its implementation. While decision-making processes limited the scope for national-level government actors to shape the GP, the national government in Kenya claimed such a space, proactively pressuring PEPFAR to change particular aspects of its GP plan. Subnational level actors were typically recipients of top-down decision-making with apparently limited scope to resist or change GP. While civil society had the potential to hold both PEPFAR and government actors accountable, the closed-door nature of policy-making and the lack of transparency about decisions made this difficult. Conclusion Donor agencies should exercise power responsibly, especially to ensure that transition processes meaningfully engage governments and others with a mandate for service delivery. Furthermore, subnational actors and civil society are often better positioned to understand the implications and changes arising from transition. Greater transparency and accountability would increase the success of global health programme transitions, especially in the context of greater decentralisation, requiring donors and country counterparts to be more aware and flexible of working within political systems that have implications for programmatic success.
KW - health policy
KW - health systems evaluation
KW - public health
KW - qualitative study
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U2 - 10.1136/bmjgh-2022-010499
DO - 10.1136/bmjgh-2022-010499
M3 - Article
C2 - 37236658
AN - SCOPUS:85161303986
SN - 2059-7908
VL - 8
JO - BMJ Global Health
JF - BMJ Global Health
IS - 5
M1 - e010499
ER -