Airborne infection with Bacillus anthracis - From mills to mail

Kevin P. Fennelly; Amy L. Davidow; Shelly L. Miller; Nancy Connell; Jerrold J. Ellner

doi:10.3201/eid1006.020738

Airborne infection with Bacillus anthracis - From mills to mail

Kevin P. Fennelly, Amy L. Davidow, Shelly L. Miller, Nancy Connell, Jerrold J. Ellner

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

53 Scopus citations

Abstract

The lack of identified exposures in 2 of the 11 cases of bioterrorism-related inhalation anthrax in 2001 raised uncertainty about the infectious dose and transmission of Bacillus anthracis. We used the Wells-Riley mathematical model of airborne infection to estimate 1) the exposure concentrations in postal facilities where cases of inhalation anthrax occurred and 2) the risk for infection in various hypothetical scenarios of exposure to B. anthracis aerosolized from contaminated mail in residential settings. These models suggest that a small number of cases of inhalation anthrax can be expected when large numbers of persons are exposed to low concentrations of B. anthracis. The risk for inhalation anthrax is determined not only by bacillary virulence factors but also by infectious aerosol production and removal rates and by host factors.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	996-1001
Number of pages	6
Journal	Emerging infectious diseases
Volume	10
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3201/eid1006.020738
State	Published - Jun 2004
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Epidemiology
Microbiology (medical)
Infectious Diseases

Access to Document

10.3201/eid1006.020738

Cite this

@article{e417bd2e4e434f63a27f0d2db157bb11,

title = "Airborne infection with Bacillus anthracis - From mills to mail",

abstract = "The lack of identified exposures in 2 of the 11 cases of bioterrorism-related inhalation anthrax in 2001 raised uncertainty about the infectious dose and transmission of Bacillus anthracis. We used the Wells-Riley mathematical model of airborne infection to estimate 1) the exposure concentrations in postal facilities where cases of inhalation anthrax occurred and 2) the risk for infection in various hypothetical scenarios of exposure to B. anthracis aerosolized from contaminated mail in residential settings. These models suggest that a small number of cases of inhalation anthrax can be expected when large numbers of persons are exposed to low concentrations of B. anthracis. The risk for inhalation anthrax is determined not only by bacillary virulence factors but also by infectious aerosol production and removal rates and by host factors.",

author = "Fennelly, {Kevin P.} and Davidow, {Amy L.} and Miller, {Shelly L.} and Nancy Connell and Ellner, {Jerrold J.}",

year = "2004",

month = jun,

doi = "10.3201/eid1006.020738",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "10",

pages = "996--1001",

journal = "Emerging infectious diseases",

issn = "1080-6040",

publisher = "Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)",

number = "6",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Airborne infection with Bacillus anthracis - From mills to mail

AU - Fennelly, Kevin P.

AU - Davidow, Amy L.

AU - Miller, Shelly L.

AU - Connell, Nancy

AU - Ellner, Jerrold J.

PY - 2004/6

Y1 - 2004/6

N2 - The lack of identified exposures in 2 of the 11 cases of bioterrorism-related inhalation anthrax in 2001 raised uncertainty about the infectious dose and transmission of Bacillus anthracis. We used the Wells-Riley mathematical model of airborne infection to estimate 1) the exposure concentrations in postal facilities where cases of inhalation anthrax occurred and 2) the risk for infection in various hypothetical scenarios of exposure to B. anthracis aerosolized from contaminated mail in residential settings. These models suggest that a small number of cases of inhalation anthrax can be expected when large numbers of persons are exposed to low concentrations of B. anthracis. The risk for inhalation anthrax is determined not only by bacillary virulence factors but also by infectious aerosol production and removal rates and by host factors.

AB - The lack of identified exposures in 2 of the 11 cases of bioterrorism-related inhalation anthrax in 2001 raised uncertainty about the infectious dose and transmission of Bacillus anthracis. We used the Wells-Riley mathematical model of airborne infection to estimate 1) the exposure concentrations in postal facilities where cases of inhalation anthrax occurred and 2) the risk for infection in various hypothetical scenarios of exposure to B. anthracis aerosolized from contaminated mail in residential settings. These models suggest that a small number of cases of inhalation anthrax can be expected when large numbers of persons are exposed to low concentrations of B. anthracis. The risk for inhalation anthrax is determined not only by bacillary virulence factors but also by infectious aerosol production and removal rates and by host factors.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=2542524740&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=2542524740&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.3201/eid1006.020738

DO - 10.3201/eid1006.020738

M3 - Review article

C2 - 15207048

AN - SCOPUS:2542524740

SN - 1080-6040

VL - 10

SP - 996

EP - 1001

JO - Emerging infectious diseases

JF - Emerging infectious diseases

IS - 6

ER -

Airborne infection with Bacillus anthracis - From mills to mail

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this